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Summary: Local government leaders in the U.S. employ a multitude of programs and 
policies in the name of economic development to increase the number of firms, employ-
ment, wages, and, of course, the tax base. The past few decades have seen a surge in 
local economic development policies, yet research analyzing their effectiveness is 
sparse. This study analyzes the relationship between local economic development policy 
and economic growth in a data set of 412 U.S. cities. Results indicate that policy has 
only has a weak correlation with economic growth, suggesting that growth is determined 
more by market conditions rather than government intervention. The article concludes 
with an entrepreneurial policy approach this author believes may yield development re-
sults in an era of limited policy effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
 
City governments face the classic economic problem of resource scarcity, and 
they must choose how to allocate scarce resources among numerous competing 
interests. Public and private sector leaders employ a multitude of programs and 
policies commonly dubbed “economic development” activities with the goal of 
increasing output resulting in economic growth and higher living standards for 
all in the region.  
  This study is an analysis of the economic development policy impacts in 
American cities. The inquiry is guided by the age-old question, “To what extent 
can government influence markets?” The major hypothesis of this study is, “The 
level of public sector economic development activity in U.S. cities is positively 
correlated with local economic growth.” All other things being equal, cities that 
are more proactive in their economic development activity should have more eco-
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nomic growth. The study uses a large data set of American cities built from multi-
ple sources to analyze the relationship between economic development programs 
and economic growth in as measured by increases in firms, jobs, and income.  
 
 
1. The Current State of the Literature 
 
An immense body of literature exists in the scholarly, trade, and popular presses 
disclosing the latest economic development methods, programs and practices, yet 
only a few empirical studies have examined the impact of these programs. It is 
thought that local economic development policies result in positive as measured 
by jobs, firms, tax revenue, and incomes (see for example, Ahlbrandt and DeAn-
geliz, 1987; Bowman, 1988; Bartik, 1991, Eisenschitz, 1993; Eisinger, 1988; 
Schwarz and Volgy, 1992; Reese and Fasenfest, 1997;and Jeong and Feiock, 2006 
). Some of the literature indicates, however, that certain economic development 
efforts yield no results, or possibly even negative results (see for example, 
Schmenner, 1984; Feiock, 1991; Lynch, 1995; Green, Fleischmann, and Kwong, 
1996; Dewar, 1998; Hinkley and Hsu, 2000; and Oakley and Tsao, 2006). Dellar 
and Stallman, however, observing “there are no low tax-high income states” sug-
gest that the market alone may not provide all that is needed for economic growth 
(p. 537, 2007). Sometimes the results are mixed. Greenbaum and Enberg (2004) 
found that economic development policy tended to help new firms, while having 
no positive effect on existing firms. If economic development practices are inef-
fective, public resources have been wasted. Public funds earmarked for economic 
development could have potentially been put to better use elsewhere. 
  The scant empirical research generally contends that government eco-
nomic development efforts are only modestly correlated with economic growth. 
A common theme throughout the literature, as Dewar (1998) points out, is that 
government development programs rarely “develop” as much as was hoped. The 
ever increasing availability of online information also threatens to make eco-
nomic developers obsolete (Levine, 2006), as firms require less assistance with 
site selection. 
  In the wake of “federal retrenchment” from urban problems, local city 
government officials have become more proactive in managing their economic 
affairs (Feiock, 1991). In light of resource scarcity and the never-ending list of 
demands from city residents, it is important to discover whether local policies 
have any positive impact on local economies. City-level analysis is preferable 
because a city’s greatest competitors are typically its neighboring cities (Tiebout, 
1956; Calzonetti and Walker, 1991; Schmenner, 1994). Public choice theory 
contends that cities compete against each other for economic growth (Tiebout, 
1956). Therefore the use of individual municipalities as the unit of analysis is 
important in a comparative study of local economic development policy.  More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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1.1 Contribution to the Literature 
 
This study adds to the existing body of research in three significant ways. First, 
unlike most of the previous studies, this study uses a large set of U.S. cities ( n = 
412) to represent all U.S. cities with populations over 25,000 ( N = 1,070 ). Sec-
ond, because economic development policy is designed to have wide impacts on 
a local economy, this study considers growth in the number of firms, jobs, and 
income, as evidence of economic growth. Third, this study adds to the existing 
body of research by analyzing whether firms or individuals benefit more from 
economic development policy by comparing private firm income gains and per-
sonal income gains in the same statistical model.  
 
 
2. Data  
 
This study uses cities with populations greater than 25,000 as the unit of analysis 
and analyzes economic growth from one period to another. Data regarding eco-
nomic conditions in U.S. cities are gleaned from the 1994 and 2000 County and 
City Data Books from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data regarding the economic 
development practices of U.S. municipalities come from the 1999 Economic De-
velopment mail survey conducted by the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA). The 912 ICMA records were merged with the 1,070 Cen-
sus records resulting in a final data set consisting of the 412 cities shown in Fig-
ure 1. Difference of means tests confirmed that the 412 sample cities are repre-
sentative of the population of 1,070 cities. 
 
Figure 1.  Map of 412 U.S. Cities Used in This Study 
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2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
To measure economic growth across time, the difference in a particular eco-
nomic indicator is calculated from an earlier time period (typically 1987) to a 
later time period (typically 1997). Financial data are expressed in constant 1997 
dollars—that is, the 1987 figures have been adjusted for inflation. Table 1 shows 
a complete list of the dependent variables and displays the descriptive statistics 
for these variables.  
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables, Measures of Economic 
Growth 
  n  Minimum Maximum Mean  St.  Dev. 
Dependent Variables Related to the Number of Firms 
 Growth, mfg firms  410 -343.0  182.0  -1.5  45.0 
 Growth, retail firms  412 -6,772.0  123.0  -477.3  647.7 
Dependent Variables Related to the Labor Force 
 Growth, jobs  412 -21,043.5  208,471.4  7,733.8  16,639.5 
 Growth, mfg employees  366 -48,764.0  20,823.0  -1,740.5  5,627.2 
 Growth, retail employees  412 -39,978.0  4,371.0  -2,244.0  4,145.7 
Dependent Variables Related to Income* 
 Mfg. value-added growth  352 -4,869,558  3,705,732  33,102.0  611,492.3 
 Retail sales growth   412 -1,004,363.6  3,103,016.4  136,767.4 391,928.7 
 Per capita income growth 406 -5,232.2  14,605.6  1,715.8  1,025.4 
*Expressed in 1997 constant dollars. 
Source: U.S. Census, County and City Data Books, 1994 and 2000. 
 
 
2.2 Independent Variables 
 
Variables from the ICMA data set that measure economic development policy 
and practice serve as independent variables in this study. These variables repre-
sent the four principal economic development objectives of attraction, retention, 
business development, and equity planning. The policy variables are scale vari-
ables measuring the number of policies used by a particular city. Descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 2. 
The economic development staff size variable is a measurement of a 
city’s human resource investment into economic development activity. To con-More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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trol for population size; this variable is expressed as capita per staff, that is the 
number of citizens per economic development worker. Similarly, the economic 
development budget variable measures the amount of money budgeted for eco-
nomic development. Larger cities are expected to have larger budgets, so to con-
trol for population size, this variable is expressed as budget per capita. If eco-
nomic development programs are effective in promoting growth, we then expect 
growth to be correlated with such investment. 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables, Measures of ED Pol-
icy 
  n  Minimum Maximum Mean  St.  Dev. 
Independent Variables Related to Economic Development Policy 
Capita Per ED Staff  295  1,843.5  1,205,278.
0  43,856.7 79,575.8 
ED Budget Per Capita   363  $0.0  $421.6  $16.1  $45.7 
Total E.D. Initiatives  412  0.0  55.0  24.7  12.6 
Public-Private Partner-
ships  412 0.0  9.0  2.3  1.7 
Independent Variables Related to Business Attraction and Retention  
% Time On Attraction  352  0.0  100.0  25.1  18.2 
Attraction Techniques  412  0.0  13.0  5.4  3.6 
Use Of Incentives  412  0.0  15.0  5.2  4.0 
% Time On Retention  362  0.0  100.0  29.0  21.7 
Retention Techniques  412  0.0  12.0  4.6  3.0 
Independent Variables Related to Business Development 
% Time On Development  358  0.0  100.0  38.1  25.0 
Use Of Sm. Bus. Dev.  412  0.0  9.0  2.0  2.1 
Use Of Loans  412  0.0  4.0  1.5  1.5 
Independent Variables Related to Equity Planning 
Use Of “Equity” Tech-
niques  412 0.0  6.0  2.6  1.8 
Source: ICMA Economic Development Survey, 1999. 
 
  The “time spent on…” variables report the percentage of time that eco-
nomic development officials reported spending on attracting, retaining, or devel-Stuart Strother 
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oping businesses in their city. Different cities have different economic condi-
tions, bringing into to question the endogeneity of their development policy ap-
proach. A city experiencing market-driven growth such as San Jose, California, 
the heart of Silicon Valley’s tech industry, will perhaps invest few public re-
sources towards attracting and retaining firms. A city whose economy is on the 
decline, however, may put more resources into attracting and retaining firms. In 
this study, the endogeneity problem is somewhat ameliorated by the ten year 
time lag between economic measurements. Table 3 shows the frequency of the 
use of specific development policies. The public-private partnerships are consid-
ered newer “third-wave” techniques (Strother, 2005). Equity planning policies 
are designed to bring economic benefits to the least fortunate in depressed areas 
of cities. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of U.S. Cities Using Certain Economic Development Poli-
cies 
Business Retention Policies  %  Business Attraction Policies  %  Incentives  % 
NGO partnerships for retention  78  Promotional material  82  Zoning and permit assis-
tance 
72 
Calling on local companies  74  Websites  70  Tax abatements  54 
Local business surveys  60  Conference attendance  61  Tax increment financing  50 
Partnering with local gov’ts  42  Community resource data-
bases 
54 Grants    45 
Business roundtables  41  Calling on companies 52  Low-cost  loans  40 
Revolving loan programs  36  Trade show participation 50  One-stop  permit  issuance  39 
Publicity for local firms  32  Media advertising  44  Free land or land write-
down 
39 
Achievement awards  24  Regional resource pooling  43  Training support  36 
Calling nat’l firm headquarters  22  Direct mail  40  Local enterprise zones  27 
Ombudsman programs  22  Hosting special events 30  Federal/state  enterprise 
zones 
27 
Export assistance  11  Trade missions abroad  14  Tax credits  25 
Import replacement  3  Ambassador programs 12  Regulatory  flexibility  23 
       Utility  rate  reduction  19 
       Special assessment districts  18 
       Relocation  assistance  18 
       Employee  screening  16 
       Subsidized  buildings  11 
          More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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Public-Private Partnerships  %  Business Development Policies %  Equity Planning Policies  % 
PPP with NGOs  70  Revolving loan funds  59  Community dev. loan funds  55 
PPP to develop ED  policy  42  Business development centers  49  CDC’s  53 
PPP with other governments   41  Matching improvement grants  32  Welfare-to-Work  49 
PPP to provide job training  19  Marketing assistance  29  Local ED zones  27 
PPP for ED zones  14  Business incubators 25  Microenterprise  27 
PPP to support CDC’s  12  Mgmt. training 17  Job  training  19 
PPP to support Welfare-to-
Work  
11 Executive/mentor  on  loan  14     
PPP for microenterprise   7  Vendor/supplier matching  9     
         
Loan Policies  %       
Revolving development loans  59        
Community dev. loan funds  55        
Low-cost loans  40        
Revolving retention loans  39        
         
CDC = Community Development Corporation 
Source: ICMA Economic Development Survey, 1999 
 
 
2.3  Control Variables 
 
Control variables that represent factors that affect city economies are also in-
cluded in this study. A complete list of the control variables and their descriptive 
statistics is shown in Table 4. Three variables are dummy variables (0 = no, 1 = 
yes), which are manufacturing economic base, technology economic base, and 
mayoral form of government.  
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics, Control Variables 
  n  Minimum Maximum Mean  St.  Dev. 
1990 Population  412  25,063  1,111,030  87,951.8  119,913.0 
Pop. Growth 1990-2000  412  -48,496  332,062  11,161.0  27,713.6 
Manufacturing Economic 
Base  412  0.00  1.00 0.16 0.36 
Technology Economic Base  412  0.00  1.00  0.04  0.20 
Taxes Per Capita  397  $67.0  $2,1730  $434.6  $255.6 
Expenditures  Per  Capita  397  $301.0  $4,088.0 $987.5 $539.3 
Mayoral Form Of Gov’t  412  0.00  1.00  0.15  0.36 
Crime Rate, 1990  412  -  37,903.0  6,580.7  4,044.7 
% Hs Grads, 1990  412  26.3  96.6  78.5  10.4 
% College Grads, 1990  412  1.7  71.2  24.0  12.1 
January Temp, Avg.  412  5.9°  68.1°  38.5°  15.1° 
Sources: ICMA Economic Development Survey, 1999, U.S. Census, County and City 
Data Books, 1994 and 2000. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
OLS regression is used to determine whether the economic development policies 
employed at the local government level are statistically significant and positively 
correlated with measures of economic growth in U.S. cities. Since the 412 cities 
comprise over a third (38.5%) of the population of 1,070 U.S. cities with popula-
tions over 25,000, the statistically insignificant correlations may prove to be 
practically significant due to the proportionally large sample. Three models are 
used: the firm growth model, the job growth model, and the income growth 
model. 
  Economic indicators serve as dependent variables in each model. Using 
SPSS, the independent variables are entered into each model in blocks. The first 
block contains all of the control variables, and then the second block adds the 
economic development policy variables. The coefficient of multiple determina-
tion (R
2) indicates the amount of the variance in the dependent variable that is 
explained, or accounted for, by these independent control variables (Lind, Mar-
chal, and Wathen, 2003, p. 435). The change in the adjusted coefficient of mul-
tiple determination (adjusted R
2 change) from the first block to the second block 
indicates the additional amount of the variance in the dependent variable that is 
accounted for by the economic development policy variables. 
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4. Results  
 
4.1. Firm Growth Model 
 
The firm growth model tests the hypothesis that cities that are more proactive in 
their efforts to attract, retain, and develop firms are those cities that experience 
growth in the absolute number of firms. Growth in the number of manufacturing 
firms and growth in the number of retail firms serve as the dependent variables.  
 
5.1.1. Manufacturing Firm Growth 
 
Table 4 reports that about 32% of the variance in manufacturing firm growth is 
explained by the control variables (adjusted R
2 = .319). Standardized regression 
coefficients for control and independent variables (β) are shown in the “Beta” 
column. Population growth is statistically significant and positively correlated 
with the dependent variable (p < 0.001, β = .527) which confirms the parallel 
migratory patterns of individuals and firms described by Koven and Shelley 
(1989). The technology economic base variable is also significant and positively 
correlated with the dependent variable (p < 0.05, β = .099) confirming the role 
of high-tech as a driver of economic growth.  
Evidently cities with higher populations (p < 0.001, β = -.548), higher 
taxes (p < 0.001, β = -.191), and higher crime rates (p < 0.1, β = -.094) are ex-
periencing a decline or slower growth in the number of manufacturing firms. 
These results confirm the trends of manufacturing firms deserting larger, high-
crime cities in favor of smaller growing cities that are most likely in suburban 
locations.  
  Adding the policy variables in the second block only explains an addi-
tional two percent of the variance in manufacturing firm growth (adjusted R
2 
change = .024). The percent time spent on attraction variable is significant and 
positively correlated with increased numbers of manufacturing firms (p < 0.05, 
β = .126). Although the standardized regression coefficient is small, we have 
some evidence that cities focusing more time on attraction are more likely to 
experience manufacturing firm growth. Conversely, the number of attraction 
techniques variable is significant and negatively correlated in this regression (p 
< 0.1, β = -.103). Perhaps this finding is evidence of the inefficacy of a “shot-
gun” policy approach. Rather than employing a vast array of attraction tech-
niques, cities might consider focusing their attraction efforts according to their 
economic base, such as is suggested in the literature espousing cluster-strategies 
(see for example, Porter, 1998). 
  The number of retention techniques is also significant and positively 
correlated in this regression (p < 0.05, β = .157). Cities employing a wider array 
of retention policies are more likely to expand their numbers of manufacturers. Stuart Strother 
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  Overall, the regression coefficients for these policy variables are small, 
indicating weak correlation. The overall interpretation of these regression results 
is that economic development policy variables only have a modest impact on the 
number of manufacturing firms in a city over and above that of the controls. 
 
5.1.2 Retail Firm Growth 
 
Using retail firm growth as the dependent variable, Table 4 reports that the block 
of control variables explains about 41 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable (adjusted R
2 = .409). Because the absolute number of retail firms is in 
decline (median = -307) this variable is more of a measure of slower decline 
rather than actual growth.  
  Population growth is significant and negatively correlated with retail 
firm growth (p < 0.001, β = -.559), perhaps explained by the trends of subur-
banization and consolidation. By 1987 (the first time period of this study) much 
of the migration of retail firms from the urban core to suburban locations (i.e. 
shopping malls, strip malls) was complete. By 1997 (the second time period of 
this study) the absolute number of these retailers was shrinking, due to consoli-
dation, as big box retail stores, such as Wal-Mart, Target and Best Buy, replace 
smaller shops. Places with higher population growth (i.e. suburban cities) lost 
more retail firms simply because they had more small shops to lose.    
The significant negative correlation of the local tax variable (p < 0.001, 
β = -.146) again illustrates private firms’ preference for low tax areas. Crime 
rates are also negatively correlated with retail firm growth (p < 0.001, β = -.250), 
which is expected as retailers tend to avoid areas with many negative external-
ities, especially crime.  
  The average January temperature is a significant positive predictor of 
retail firm growth (p < 0.05, β = .095). This is expected because retail firm loca-
tions are based on the presence of a retail market. National migration trends 
show that the South and West (warmer areas) are experiencing positive net mi-
gration, while the Northeast and Midwest (colder areas) are experiencing nega-
tive net migration (Franklin, 2003). In other words, as Americans move south 
with their retail shopping dollars, retailers follow with their wares.  
  Entering the policy variables in the second block explains only an addi-
tional two percent of the variance in retail firm growth (adjusted R
2 change = 
.021). The number of attraction techniques is the only policy variable positively 
correlated with retail firm growth (p < 0.05, β = .116). This can be interpreted 
that the cities employing a greater number of attraction techniques are more 
likely to experience growth in the number of retail firms.  
  The number of incentive techniques variable is significant and nega-
tively correlated with retail firm growth (p < 0.05, β = -.165). It is unlikely that 
the offering of more types of incentives exerts a causal effect on the number of More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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retail firms. More than likely, the significance of this variable reflects the reality 
that cities experiencing retail decline are probably experiencing many other eco-
nomic hardships also. In desperate times, city leaders have been known to make 
riskier speculative decisions, such as incentives, with public funds.  
 
Table 4.  Firm Growth Model Regression Results 
  Mfg. Firm Growth  Retail Firm Growth  
Control Variables  Beta   Beta   
population -.552  ***  †   
population growth  .494  ***  -.572  *** 
mfg. economic base  -.015    -.007   
tech. economic base  .102  **  -.043   
local taxes (capita)  -.210  ***  -.159  *** 
mayor form of gov’t  -.011    .024   
crime rate  -.087  *  -.251  *** 
% high school grads  .045    .008   
January temp. avg.  .048    .066   
Policy Variables        
ED staff size (capita)  -.046    -.034   
ED budget (capita)  -.044    -.047   
% time on attraction  .126  **  .029   
attraction techniques  -.103  *  .116  ** 
% time on retention  -.005    -.047   
retention techniques  .157  **  -.028   
% time on development  .000    -.042   
develop. techniques  .091    -.011   
loans .041    -.033   
incentives -.042    -.165  ** 
PPP -.034    .001   
        
n  412   412   
Block 2 F  11.71 ***  17.30  *** 
Block 1 Adjusted R
2  .319   .409   
Block 2 Adjusted R
2  .343   .430   
Adjusted R
2 change .024  **  .021  ** 
* P < 0.1          ** P < 0.05          *** P < 0.001 
† excluded due to multicollinearity Stuart Strother 
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4.2. Job Growth Model 
 
The job growth model tests the hypothesis that cities that are more proactive in 
their economic development efforts experience growth in the number of jobs. 
The dependent variables in these models are the absolute difference in the num-
ber of jobs from 1987 to 1997. 
 
4.2.1. Overall Job Growth 
 
Table 5 reports that only about six percent of the variance in overall job growth 
is explained by the control variables (adjusted R
2 = .060). Similar to a previous 
regression, the technology economic base is significant and positively correlated 
with overall job growth (p < 0.05, β = .108). This reflects structural changes as 
the macroeconomy takes on more characteristics of the New Economy. The high 
school graduate percentage variable is also significant and positively correlated 
with job growth. This underscores the important role of human capital develop-
ment as an essential part of economic growth.  
  Crime rates are also significant and positively correlated with overall job 
growth (p < 0.001, β = .219). Perhaps the dynamism that creates jobs also at-
tracts non-law abiding citizens. The local tax variable is again significant and 
negatively correlated with economic growth (p < 0.1, β = -.094) again illustrat-
ing the inclination of businesses to avoid high tax areas. 
  Adding the policy variables in the second block explains an additional 
two percent of the variance in overall job growth (adjusted R
2 change = .024). 
The development techniques variable accounts for much of this change. It is sta-
tistically significant and contributes to prediction of overall job growth more 
than all of the other variables in this regression (p < 0.001, β = .220). These re-
sults emphasize the important role entrepreneurial development policies play in 
economic growth.  
  Economic development staff size is also significant and positively corre-
lated with overall job growth (p < 0.1, β = .081). City governments employing 
larger (per capita) numbers of economic development practitioners are experi-
encing more job growth than cities with smaller staffs.  
  Noting that this regression only explains about eight percent of the vari-
ance in job growth (adjusted R
2 = .084) illustrates that job growth is perhaps 
more dependent upon market factors than policy and the control variables in-
cluded in this regression. However, the regression coefficient for the business 
development techniques variable is larger than any of the others suggesting these 
techniques are more likely to foster job growth than other techniques. 
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4.2.2 Manufacturing Job Growth 
 
Using manufacturing job growth as the dependent variable, Table 5 reports that 
the control variables in the first block explain about thirty five percent of the 
variance in manufacturing job growth (adjusted R
2 = .351). Most of this manu-
facturing job growth is accounted for by the population variable which is signifi-
cant and negatively correlated with manufacturing job growth (p < 0.001, β = -
.687) consistent with a massive body of literature that documents the decline of 
manufacturing jobs in larger cities, as explained by the trends of mechanization 
(labor replaced by machines), globalization (labor replaced by cheap overseas 
labor), and suburbanization (production moved from cities to suburban sites). 
Suburban cities are smaller than central cities and have higher population growth 
rates which explains why the population growth variable is statistically signifi-
cant and positively correlated with manufacturing job growth (p < 0.001, β = 
.382). 
  Local government taxes are again statistically significant and negatively 
correlated with job growth (p < 0.001, β = -.155), which can be interpreted vari-
ous ways. Perhaps job-creating firms are tax-averse and avoid high-tax areas. Or 
perhaps the loss of jobs (or lack of growth of jobs) in a city forces that city to 
place higher per capita tax burdens on the workers that remain employed. Cities 
experiencing economic decline, such as many Rust Belt cities, are often saddled 
with crumbling infrastructure which requires greater public investment for main-
tenance.  
  Adding the economic development policy variables to the regression in 
the second block results in no change in the explained variance in manufacturing 
job growth (adjusted R
2 change = .000). The economic development budget per 
capita variable is the only statistically significant policy variable (p < 0.1, β = -
.079). The correlation is negative, indicating that cities investing more money in 
economic development still experience less manufacturing job growth.  
 
4.2.3. Retail Job Growth 
 
In the retail job growth regression the control variables explain almost twenty 
four percent of the variance in retail job growth (adjusted R
2 = .239). The sig-
nificant positive correlation of the January temperature variable (p < 0.05, β = 
.132) reveals that retail job growth largely follows the migration pattern from the 
North and East, to the West and South. 
  The local tax rate variable is statistically significant and negatively cor-
related with the dependent variable (p < 0.001, β = -.222) underscoring the rela-
tionship between higher tax rates and slower economic growth. Population 
growth is also significant and negatively correlated with retail job growth (p < 
0.001, β = -.331); further evidence of the trend of retail consolidation. Cities Stuart Strother 
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with severely declining populations may have already lost much of the retail 
base and would not show any additional job loss. The crime rate variable is also 
significant and negatively correlated with retail job growth (p < 0.001, β = -.274) 
perhaps reflecting retailers’ aversion to high-crime areas.  
  Adding the policy variables improves the prediction of retail job growth 
by about two percent (adjusted R
2 change = .018). The incentives variable is sig-
nificant and once again negatively correlated with the dependent variable (p < 
0.05, β = -.171), demonstrating that cities offering more types of fiscal incen-
tives to businesses are more likely cities that are losing retail jobs. The fact that 
economic development policy has little positive correlation with retail jobs is 
expected because economic decisions are driven by profit potential, not the 
amount of government programs.  More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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Table 5.  Job Growth Model Regression Results 
  Overall Job Growth  Mfg. Job Growth  Retail Job Growth 
Control Variables  Beta   Beta   Beta   
population †    -.673  ***  †   
population growth  †    .359  ***  -.344  *** 
mfg. economic base  .043    -.021    .041   
tech. economic base  .099  **  -.014    -.020   
local taxes (capita)  -.108  **  -.160  ***  -.237  *** 
mayor form of gov’t  -.033    -.007    .035   
crime rate  .218  ***  -.056    -.288  *** 
% high school grads  .197  ***  .036    .001   
January temp. avg.  .054    .032    .108  ** 
Policy Variables           
ED staff size (capita)  .081  *  -.040    -.048   
ED budget (capita)  .005    -.079  **  -.043   
% time on attraction  .003    .051    .066   
attraction techniques  .045    -.007    .059   
% time on retention  -.076    .010    -.050   
retention techniques  .047    .059    -.069   
% time on develop.  .024    -.025    -.061   
develop. techniques  .220  ***  .006    -.042   
loans -.079    -001    -.039   
incentives -.019    -.001    -.171  ** 
PPP -.051    -.017    -.026   
“equity” techniques  .023    .036    .081   
            
n  412   412   412   
Block 2 F  2.97 ***  11.49 ***  8.13  *** 
Block 1 Adjusted R
2  .060    .351    .239  
Block 2 Adjusted R
2  .084   .349   .257   
Adjusted R
2 change .024  **  -.002    .018  ** 
* P < 0.1          ** P < 0.05          *** P < 0.001 
† excluded due to multicollinearity 
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4.3. Income Growth Model 
 
The income growth model tests the hypothesis that economic development pol-
icy has positive impacts on personal and corporate income. The dependent vari-
ables are growth in per capita income, growth in manufacturing value added, and 
growth in retail sales. Growth is measured as the inflation-adjusted difference in 
income from 1987 to 1997. 
 
4.3.1. Per Capita Income Growth 
 
In this regression shown in Table 6, per capita income growth from 1990 to 1999 
is the dependent variable. The control variables explain fifteen percent of the 
variance in income growth (adjusted R
2 = .148). Significant predictors of income 
growth include the technology base (p < 0.01, β = .146), higher percentages of 
high school graduates (p < 0.001, β = .248) and cooler climates (p < 0.001, β = 
.330). An additional four percent (adjusted R
2 change = .035) of the variance in 
income growth is explained by the policy variables. Consistent with earlier find-
ings, the incentive variable is once again negatively correlated with growth (p < 
0.10, β = -.161). Although not statistically significant (p = .140), the percent 
time spent on development had the highest beta value, underscoring the impor-
tance of a policy approach that favors entrepreneurship and business develop-
ment. 
 
4.3.2. Manufacturing Value Added 
 
The manufacturing value added growth variable is a proxy measure of the ag-
gregate profitability of all manufacturing firms in the study cities from 1987 to 
1997. The control variables in this regression explain thirteen percent of the 
variance in manufacturing value added growth (adjusted R
2 = .130). This entire 
variance is accounted for by two variables. The population variable is significant 
and negatively correlated with manufacturing value added (p < 0.001, β = -.254). 
The population growth variable is also significant but is positively correlated 
with the dependent variable (p < 0.001, β = .490), indicating the value added of 
manufacturing firms in larger cities is not growing as much as it is in smaller 
cities. Inspection of the data revealed manufacturing value added actually 
dropped by an average of $123,624 in the largest quartile (103 largest cities). 
The smallest quartile of study cities experienced an average manufacturing value 
added growth of $78,238. This is no doubt a reflection of two trends: the shift of 
manufacturing from larger Rust Belt cities to smaller Sun Belt cities, and the 
shift of manufacturing from urban core cities to the suburbs. 
  Adding the policy variables to the model did not improve the prediction 
of the dependent variable (adjusted R
2 change = -.007) and none of the policy More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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variables were statistically significant. It appears that local economic develop-
ment policy has no discernable impact on the value added of manufacturing 
firms in a city. 
 
4.3.3. Retail Sales Growth 
 
Retail sales growth is the change in inflation-adjusted sales from 1987 to 1997 
for all retailers within a city. The control variables explain about nine percent of 
the variance in retail sales growth (adjusted R
2 = .086). Population is significant 
and positively correlated with retail sales (p < 0.001, β = .178). The percentage 
of high school graduates variable is also significant and positively correlated 
with retail sales growth (p < 0.001, β = .248). Larger cities and cities with higher 
levels of human capital appear to have higher volumes of retail sales. The tax 
variable is again significant and negatively correlated with the dependent vari-
able (p < 0.05, β = -.163). Apparently retail sales are lower in cities with higher 
taxes.  
  Adding the policy variables explains an additional two percent of the 
variance in retail sales (adjusted R
2 change = .019). The percent time spent on 
attraction variable is significant and positively correlated with retail sales (p < 
0.05, β = .130), and the number of attraction techniques is significant but nega-
tively correlated with retail sales (p < 0.1, β = -.117). The modest correlations of 
these policy variables raises doubts about the ability of economic development 
officials to impact retail sales in their city. 
  The income growth model was designed to compare the benefits of eco-
nomic development policy experienced by individuals (per capita income) to the 
benefits experienced by firms (manufacturing value added, and retail sales 
growth). But in all three of the regressions, economic development policy had no 
substantial impact on the income growth of either individuals or firms. The ap-
parent answer to the question, “Who benefits more, individuals or firms?” is 
“neither.” The income growth of individuals and the income growth of firms 
have no substantial correlation with economic development policy. Local gov-
ernment taxes and expenditures also have no substantial correlation with income 
growth. Another possible explanation is that the benefits of economic develop-
ment policy are experienced by only certain individuals or firms, and these bene-
fits are indiscernible in this study’s aggregate data. Stuart Strother 
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Table 6.  Income Growth Model Regression Results 
  Per Capita In-
come Growth 
Mfg. Value Added 
Growth 
Retail Sales 
Growth 
Control Variables  Beta  Beta   Beta   
population  -.085   -.239 ***  .175 ** 
population  growth  .120   .490 ***  †  
mfg.  economic  base  -.414   -.074   .079  
tech. economic base  .146  **  -.001    .040   
local taxes (capita)  -.091    -.018    -.053   
mayor form of gov’t  -.054    .009    .014   
crime  rate  .091   -.034   .089 * 
% high school grads  .248  ***  .004    .144  ** 
January temp. avg.  -.330  ***  -.067    -.073   
Policy Variables          
ED staff size (capita)  .001    -.069    -.044   
ED budget (capita)  -.045    -.001    .059   
% time on attraction  .049    -.051    .130  ** 
attraction  techniques  -.051   .039   -.117 * 
% time on retention  .099    .007    .038   
retention  techniques  .027   -.006   -.050  
% time on develop.  .156    -.056    -.005   
develop.  techniques  .034   -.045   -.010  
loans  -.036   -.017   -.010  
incentives  -.161 *  .037   -.047  
PPP  .114   .080   .043  
“equity”  techniques  -.026   -.086   .036  
            
n  221   412   412   
Block 2 F  3.35  ***  3.76 ***  3.41 *** 
Block 1 Adjusted R
2  .148   .130   .086  
Block 2 Adjusted R
2  .183   .123    .105   
Adjusted R
2 change .035    -.007    .019  * 
* p < 0.1          ** p < 0.05          *** p < 0.001 More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study discovers only modest evidence that local government economic de-
velopment programs are correlated with economic growth in American cities. 
Despite this discouraging news, the results of this study do have certain applica-
tions to real-life local economic development policy decisions noted below. 
 
5.1. Entrepreneurial Development 
 
The use of business development techniques was statistically significant and 
positively correlated with overall job growth in this study. Research shows that 
small businesses and start-up companies are responsible for much of the job 
creation and economic growth in the U.S (Birch, 1987; Edmiston, 2007).  There-
fore it is recommended that economic development officials commit to the de-
velopment of new entrepreneurial firms and the expansion of existing firms us-
ing techniques such as business incubators, microenterprise programs, revolving 
loan funds, matching improvement grants, marketing assistance, management 
training, executive on loan programs, and other similar programs. Many of these 
business development initiatives provide capital and training, two essential ele-
ments needed by any start-up business.  
 
5.2. Develop High Tech 
 
Economic hardship in U.S. cities is often blamed on manufacturing sector de-
clines. But every city has not experienced a decline in manufacturing. In fact, 
cities with a technology economic base were more likely to experience growth in 
the number of manufacturing firms and the overall number of jobs as reported in 
two of the regressions. Instead of an overall decline in manufacturing, what is 
occurring is a shift towards high-tech manufacturing, which is responsible for 
“about two-thirds of U.S. economic growth since 1990” (Bee, 2000, p. 15). 
  
5.3. Human Capital Investment 
 
The high school graduate variable was statistically significant and positively cor-
related with economic growth in three of the regressions. Previous studies have 
shown a link between human capital and economic growth (Becker, 1970; Asefa 
and Huang, 1994), and an empirical study by Warner notes, “Evidence suggests 
that a strategy focusing on human capital is more effective at stimulating per 
capita income growth than one designed to reduce firm costs” (1989, p. 389). In 
other words, investing in a city’s workers may pay better dividends than invest-
ing in a city’s firms.  
 Stuart Strother 
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5.4. Never Pay For Retail 
 
Fiscal incentives are negatively correlated with growth in the number of retail 
firms and jobs. Retail firms make their location decisions primarily based on 
profit potential and government incentives are unlikely to influence a retail 
firm’s location decisions, although the retail firm certainly will not turn down an 
incentive if offered. Knowing the futility of offering incentives to retail, certain 
local governments, such as Buncombe County, North Carolina prohibit such 
practices outright (Buncombe County Economic Development Incentive Policy, 
1998). 
 
5.5. Competitive Regionalism 
 
When firms pit cities against each other in a bidding war for their mobile capital 
investment, such competition is often zero-sum “if it results in oversubsidization 
where the public incentives merely relocate a company between individual com-
peting areas” (McCarthy, 2000, p. 1). A potential solution to the zero-sum game 
is so-called “competitive regionalism” which “involves cooperative networks of 
local public, private, and nonprofit bodies, with higher tiers of the state, that fo-
cus their economic development efforts for the benefit of the metropolitan region 
as a whole” (McCarthy, 2000, p. 1). Mallot (2007) suggests that local govern-
ments within a region collaborate with each other to develop the region. 
  
5.6. Accountable Growth 
 
Cities that give financial incentives to companies should hold those companies 
accountable for the economic growth they have promised through tools such as 
performance criteria, clawbacks, public disclosure, and a comprehensive plan. 
By agreeing on specific performance criteria up-front, a local government is able 
to “claw back” their forgone revenue. A firm that promises 500 new jobs but 
only creates 250 would be required to pay back half of the value of the received 
incentives. Greater public disclosure of incentives could also improve account-
ability, especially for politicians. A comprehensive plan makes incentives 
“available to all firms that satisfy eligibility criteria, rather than acting as bait to 
lure a particular company” (Ihlanfeldt, 1995, p. 341). Offering incentives more 
equally can eliminate the unjust practice of forcing existing firms and individu-
als to bear the tax burden of subsidized firms. 
 
5.7. Focus on Individuals, not just Firms 
 
If every city doles out corporate welfare equally, cities can therefore no longer 
expect an advantage over other cities simply by offering incentives. To cease More Employers, More Jobs, More Money: An Empirical Analysis of Local Economic… 
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offering incentives, however, would put a city at a disadvantage. Following the 
logic of Florida’s (2002) argument that members of the creative class drive eco-
nomic growth, certain cities are attempting to attract educated, creative individu-
als by ensuring that the quality of life in their city is attractive. Barry Alberts, an 
economic development official in Louisville, Kentucky suggests, “Competing 
for firms is the old way, and competing for people is the new way” of economic 
development (2004). Just as the presence of amenities can help attract individu-
als, the absence of disamenities is also attractive. In this study crime rates were 
negatively correlated with growth in three of the regressions in the previous 
chapter which suggests a link between growth and crime. Focusing solely on 
developing more urban amenities does not guarantee economic growth, but as 
Doctoroff  points out, a higher quality of life can certainly be the tiebreaker be-
tween cities competing for high tech workers and firms (2006, p. 17).  
  Economic development practice in American cities has increased its fer-
vency in recent years due to political phenomenon such as federal retrenchment 
and economic phenomenon such as globalization and shifts toward the New 
Economy. The focus has been on attraction, retention, and development of busi-
nesses in the local economy. This study analyzed whether these economic de-
velopment policies and programs actually impact the local economy. Consistent 
with previous empirical research, this study finds only modest evidence that 
economic development policy has positive impacts on economic growth.  
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